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1.1 Introduction
Up until the beginning of the 19th century,
human water use was largely confined to
streamside uses for drinking, stock watering
and water-powered mills, as well as in-
stream use for navigation. There were
exceptions in the ancient hydraulic
civilizations in Mesopotamia, Egypt, China,
India and a few other locations, which
abstracted large volumes of water from
major rivers to irrigate extensive tracts of
riparian floodplain. However, whereas the
local impacts of these abstractions were
significant, on a global scale, river flow
regimes were still largely dictated by
natural features and forces, and water users
were primarily natural biota.
As the world population grew, from less
than 1 billion (109) in 1800, to 1.7 billion in
1900, to more than 6 billion today, human
demands for water also expanded. Growing
urban concentrations, often along rivers, led
to significant abstractions of water from
rivers for these settlements and to negative
impacts on water quality. At the same time,
the industrial revolution created new
demands for water, and new technology and
the growing demand for food gave rise to an
expanding irrigated agriculture throughout
the world.
The latter half of the 19th century saw
great strides in the development of hydrau-
lic technology for controlling major rivers
and transporting water over long distances
for irrigation and domestic purposes. Many
of these developments took place in the
Asian subcontinent, and engineers from
the USA and other countries pilgrimaged to
British India to learn this new technology
(e.g. Wilson, 1891). The following century
witnessed a great remaking of river systems
across the world, as humans manipulated
the natural hydrology to meet the domestic
supply, sanitation, food, fibre and industrial
needs of growing populations and rising
standards of living. During much of the 20th
century, expanding water supply was the
easiest and least costly way of satisfying
these demands, since water was relatively
abundant and the harmful impacts on the
environment were incremental, individually
modest and at first little noticed.
From a situation of limited, low-impact
and largely riparian uses of water, we have
now reached a point where, in many
parts of the world, cumulative uses of river
resources have not just local but basin-wide
and regional impacts. The result is that
water resources in many river basins are
fully or almost fully committed to a variety
of purposes, both in-stream and remote;
water quality is degraded; river-dependent
ecosystems are threatened; and still-
expanding demand is leading to intense
competition and, at times, to strife. In
response, there is growing interest in man-
agement systems that can bring together
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fragmented water uses, and water users, into
an integrated planning, allocation and man-
agement framework. A common element of
these approaches is that they do not just
cover a single water use or an administrative
jurisdiction, but deal with an entire river
basin or sub-basin, such as the Colombia, the
Indus or the Limpopo.
Integrated management frameworks
promises a number of important benefits:
• Greater utility from a given amount of
water through adjusted allocations;
• Reduced groundwater mining through
conjunctive management of ground
and surface water;
• More intensive reuse of water through
planned sequencing of uses;
• Improved water quality through more
comprehensive data collection, moni-
toring and enforcement;
• Incorporation of current social and
environmental values into water alloca-
tion and management decision making;
• Inclusion of a wider range of basin
stakeholders into decision making;
• Reduced conflict among users.
Despite this promise, and although highly
fashionable of late in policy circles,
integrated river basin management (RBM)
is rather rare in practice. Reasons for this
include the following:
• It requires genuine collaboration
among administrative and sectoral
units;
• It usually involves reductions in dis-
cretionary authority on the part of
existing managing agencies;
• Managers who would gain influence
over basin decision making may cur-
rently be bureaucratically and politi-
cally weaker than current managers;
• Its costs can be significant;
• It creates uncertainty for present
resource users;
• It makes planning and decision making
more complex.
Given these potentially inhibiting factors, it
is not so surprising that there are not more
practising examples of integrated manage-
ment of water resources at the basin level.
In order to hurdle these constraints, dissat-
isfaction with the current situation must
be intense, and the prospective benefits
of a new management regime significant. It
is these conditions that we explore in this
chapter.
This chapter defines the basic elements
and concepts comprising integrated basin
management and other key concepts and
then focuses on the process of analysing
institutional arrangements for RBM to
further our understanding of institutional
design. To do this, we first discuss institu-
tions, organizations and policies in relation
to water management. We then outline an
essential functions and enabling conditions
framework for analysing basin management
regimes and discuss possible institutional
arrangements for RBM that meet the needs of
locally managed irrigation.
1.2 Terms and Concepts
1.2.1 River basin water resource
management
There are a number of terms used to des-
cribe an integrated process of assessing and
managing water resources at the basin level.
Most are variations on the terms integrated
water resource management or river basin
management (RBM).
Integrated water resource management
(IWRM) is a newer term and is defined by the
Global Water Partnership (TAC, 2000) in the
following way:
IWRM is a process which promotes the
co-ordinated development and management
of water, land and related resources, in
order to maximize the resultant economic
and social welfare in an equitable manner
without compromising the sustainability of
vital ecosystems.
IWRM tends to have a strong normative
content, often referring to the Dublin
Principles and emphasizing such values
as economic benefit, equity, sustainability
and public participation. It is implicitly
suggested that all these values can be
made commensurate and compatible, but in
2 M. Svendsen et al.
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practice, there are often trade-offs between
them, particularly between equity and eco-
nomic efficiency, and between economic
welfare and sustainability.
RBM is a more traditional term and has
more recently broadened its meaning to
encompass many of the same features and
values which characterize IWRM. RBM is
defined by Mostert et al. (2000) as follows:
RBM is the management of water systems as
part of the broader natural environment and
in relation to their socio-economic
environment.
This definition is simpler and less overtly
value-laden than the previous one. Both
definitions encompass both planning
and management of water resources, even
though the planning element is implicit. A
key element of both concepts is that plan-
ning and management units almost always
cut across other divisions more tradition-
ally used to manage resources, such as
sectors, provinces or even nations, and
herein lies both their great strength and
their challenge. Some divisions across
which the approach we are discussing
extends are shown in Box 1.1.
Typically, the boundaries of the man-
agement unit are defined hydrologically, as
a basin or a sub-basin, defined by Mostert
et al. (2000) as follows:
A river basin is the geographical area deter-
mined by the watershed limits of a system
of waters, both ground and surface, flowing
to a common terminus.
In a few areas, concepts do diverge some-
what. Basin management can readily be
extended to management of other related
resources in a basin, especially land
resources. IWRM focuses more tightly
on the water resource. At times RBM
also extends into the realm of river basin
development, in which case project-based
development of new basin infrastructure
often acquires a dominant position in the
paradigm. Millington (2000) notes that pro-
ject design or evaluation, construction and
operation is still a very strong role of
many river basin organizations. Experience
has shown that where project-based design
and construction is a major activity,
resource management functions tend to
receive low priority. IWRM grows out of a
‘post-construction’ milieu, where basins are
closing (Chapter 2) and new construction
tends not to be the dominant activity.
One important caveat to all this is
that integrated basin management does
not imply or require a single basin manage-
ment organization. There is an unfortunate
tendency in some quarters to equate basin
management with a unitary basin manage-
ment organization and to assume that in the
absence of such an organization, effective
integrated management is not possible. This
is most certainly an incorrect assumption,
as experience in the western USA demon-
strates, and, in general, monolithic manage-
ment organizations are the exception rather
than the rule. The prototype for such
thinking is probably the American Tennes-
see Valley Authority (TVA), which was,
in its original form, an integrated basin
development authority established during
the economic depression of the 1930s to
work in a very underdeveloped region of
the country.1 The TVA took on a wide range
of development functions, including water
resource development, in an area in which
there was a dearth of effective organizational
coverage by other public entities. The failure
Managing River Basins 3
Box 1.1. Integrated basin management.
Although the term integrated most commonly
refers to integration across use sectors, such
as agriculture and urban water supply, it can
also encompass a number of other divisions,
including the following:
• Administrative jurisdictions
• Ground and surface water
• Upstream and downstream reaches
• Environmental and human uses
• Supply and demand management
• Water quantity and quality
• Land and water use
• Trans-boundary uses
1 The TVA has since evolved into an energy production and management agency.
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of most other attempts patterned on the
TVA, such as the Damodar Valley Authority
in India in the 1950s, suggests the unique-
ness of this model. More common among
effective basin management set-ups is a
coordinated model in which the efforts of a
number of different entities are articulated
(see Section 1.3.4).
1.2.2 Institutional arrangements
How water is used in a river basin is deter-
mined by the interactions between water
users, technology and water availability,
and hence is a sociotechnical process
(Mollinga, 1998). Water management orga-
nizations and institutions structure and
mediate these interactions, and in turn are
reshaped by water use in practice.
The terms ‘institutions’ and ‘organiza-
tions’ are often used interchangeably, but
it is useful to distinguish between them.
In mainstream institutional theory, institu-
tions are understood to be ‘the humanly
devised constraints that shape human inter-
action’ (North, 1990, p. 3), and consist of
complexes of norms, values and behaviours
that persist over time and inform action
(Uphoff, 1986). In this view, institutions
provide structure and regularity to everyday
life by reducing uncertainty and providing a
guide to human interaction. They are what
Sir V.S. Naipaul calls ‘the contract between
man and man’. A central tenet of this view is
that institutions work to reduce transaction
costs by reducing the costs of monitoring
and responding to the behaviour of others.
Organizations, on the other hand, are
defined as ‘groups of individuals bound by
some common purpose to achieve objec-
tives’ (North, 1990, p. 5). Other definitions
highlight the importance of seeing organiza-
tions as ‘structures of recognized and
accepted roles’ instead of only groups of
individuals, yielding a more realistic and
accurate definition (Uphoff, 1986). Organi-
zations are created intentionally within an
existing web of institutions. Hence, what
types of organizations exist and how they
evolve are fundamentally influenced by the
broader network of institutions in which
they are embedded. Organizations, in turn,
influence how institutions evolve over
time. Organizations constitute a subset
of institutions, which are distinguished by
their purposive origin and maintenance and
their hierarchically organized roles.
In this book, the combination of
the institutions and organizations involved
in water management is termed the institu-
tional arrangements for water manage-
ment. Institutional arrangements for water
management thus include the following:
• The established policy and legal envi-
ronment (policies, laws, rules, rights,
regulations, conventions, and customs,
both formal and informal);
• Water management organizations with
responsibilities in water management;
• Processes, mechanisms and procedures
for decision making, coordination,
negotiation and planning.
At this point, a chasm opens, which must
be carefully negotiated. Policies, rules and
regulations, as specified by public authori-
ties, may differ substantially from the appli-
cation of those rules in practice. Moreover,
local rules, such as those governing the
allocation of water, for example, may
be quite different from the formal set of
rules promulgated by state authorities. The
student of institutional arrangements must
thus be aware of both the formal rules, and
the set of rules-in-use, which operate on the
ground. The importance of the differences
that often exist between the two has led one
prominent analyst to define institutions
explicitly as rules-in-use, rather than
simply as rules (Ostrom, 1992).
To this point, we have treated
institutional arrangements as fixed and pre-
existing. To animate this static view, it
is necessary to consider how institutions
emerge and how changes in them take
place. Alternative approaches to the study
of institutions, grounded in anthropology
and sociology, argue that institutions are not
only ‘the rules of the game’ or ‘sets of work-
ing rules or rules-in-use’ (cf. North, 1990;
Ostrom, 1990) but are reproduced, trans-
formed and subverted through interactions
4 M. Svendsen et al.
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and negotiations between actors (Mosse,
1997; Cleaver, 1999; Mehta et al., 1999). This
approach suggests that institutions emerge
historically from interactions, negotiations
and contests between heterogeneous actors
having diverse goals, and that they only con-
tinue to exist if they are invested in or prac-
tised. Thus, institutions cannot be seen apart
from what people do, and are constantly
made and remade through people’s prac-
tices (Mehta et al., 1999). Cleaver suggests
that, ‘[t]he institutions for the management
of water . . . are socially located and critically
depend on the maintenance of a number of
gray areas and ambiguity regarding rights
of access, compliance and rules, [and] on a
continuous process of negotiation between
all users’ (1999, p. 602). Such a notion of
institutions opens avenues to analyse how
power pervades institutional arrangements
and gives rise to differentiated access to and
control over water, and, more importantly,
how to design processes to redress
inequities.
Because water is essential to life and
livelihood security and has multiple uses
and users, water management readily gives
rise to intractable or ‘wicked’ problems,
especially where competition for water
is acute. Wicked problems are clusters of
interrelated problems characterized by high
levels of uncertainty and a diversity of com-
peting values and decision stakes (Ackoff,
1974; Rittel and Webber, 1973). The set of
problems constituting a wicked problem
cannot be solved in isolation from one
another and are intractable since what con-
stitutes a solution for one group of individu-
als entails the generation of a new problem
for another. As wicked problems are charac-
terized by competing perceptions and
values, and often also involve power
disparities, they enter the realm of politics,
understood here broadly as the forum for
choosing among values and the process
through which relations of power are consti-
tuted, negotiated, reproduced or otherwise
shaped (cf. Mollinga, 2001). Water is
frequently a politically contested resource:
a contest with unpredictable and unstable
outcomes and diverging pathways to alter-
native futures (cf. Mosse, 1997; Mehta, 2000;
Mollinga, 2001). Likewise, water manage-
ment institutions and policies are frequently
contested and the outcomes of political
practices.
1.2.3 Institutional effectiveness
From the brief discussion of institutions
and organizations above, it is apparent that
studying effective institutional arrange-
ments for water management is conceptu-
ally challenging. If institutions differ in
principle and in practice, are contested,
beset with ambiguities and the outcomes
of political practices, it follows that what
is defined as ‘effective’ by some will be
deemed ineffective by others. Nonetheless,
at an intuitive level, it is clear that the
strong connection between institutions and
how water is managed is indisputable.
Heathcote (1998, p. 7) suggests that institu-
tional arrangements for water management
may be considered effective if they:
1. Allow an adequate supply of water that
is sustainable over many years and provide
equity in access to this water.
2. Maintain water quality at levels that
meet government standards and other
societal water quality objectives.
3. Allow sustained economic develop-
ment over the short and long term.2
Thus, institutional arrangements for RBM
are effective if they promote and achieve
sustainable water management. Sustain-
ability can broadly be defined as a condi-
tion in which natural and social systems
survive and thrive together indefinitely
(Euston and Gibson, 1995).
To be sustainable, water management
must protect and restore natural systems,
enhance the well-being of people and
Managing River Basins 5
2 A fourth condition relating to maintaining ecological systems could be added here, but in our treatment is
covered by an expanded definition of sustainability.
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improve economic efficiency. These three
objectives are often mutually exclusive, as
the partial attainment of one has negative
effects for attaining the others. This con-
tested nature of water makes the institu-
tional arrangements for water management
of paramount importance, but also highly
problematic. If institutions are viewed in
managerial or interventionist terms, effec-
tive institutions are seen as those that
contribute to attaining sustainable water
management by reducing transaction costs,
enhancing collective action and increasing
certainty. If a more process-oriented and
dynamic view of institutions is adopted,
emphasis is placed on how institutions are
embedded in power relations, and equity,
and not economic efficiency, is a central
concern.
1.2.4 Policy
Although established policies are included
under our definition of institutional
arrangements, they are often treated sepa-
rately in discussions of ‘policy and institu-
tional arrangements’. One reason for this
is that new policies not yet fully imple-
mented do not necessarily rise to the level
of ‘institutions’, as they have not demon-
strated an ability to persist. Consequently,
they are discussed separately here.
Policies provide a direction and suggest
a course of action intended to influence
decisions and actions in a particular realm
of interest. Water resource policy thus
gives overall guidance and direction to
decisions and actions that determine the
uses, protections and costs of water, and
the subsidies and prohibitions related to
its use. In the face of changing conditions,
needs, priorities and values, policies and
resulting actions must also change. Policies
are important to water resource management
because they can serve as important entry
points into the established cycle of water
management practices.
An instrumentalist view of government
conceptualizes policy as a tool to regulate
a population from the top down, through
incentives and sanctions. Shore and Wright
(1997, p. 5) summarize the conventional
definition of policy as ‘an intrinsically tech-
nical, rational, action-oriented instrument
that decision makers use to solve problems
and affect change’. Although many would
agree that policies frequently fail to function
as intended, there is a shared understanding
that a good policy is one that adheres to
the standard of rationality contained in the
above definition.
However, conceiving of policy develop-
ment and application as an unproblematic
linear process that progresses from formula-
tion to implementation to expected out-
comes is dangerous, as it obscures how
policies are produced through decidedly
non-linear and non-rational means, through
public and private negotiations, log-rolling,3
political pressure, media manipulation,
legal action and other processes involving a
range of actors within and outside of govern-
ment circles. Moreover, there is seldom a
simple progression from policy formulation,
to legislation, to framing regulations, to exe-
cution. The real process is much less tidy,
with iterations, false starts and backtracking,
where the lead role alternates between
policy formulation and application.
An alternative perspective on analysing
how policies lead to changes in water
management practices conceives of policy
formulation and implementation as political
processes in which many interests are at
stake. Premised on the notion that water
management is a politically contested
terrain (Mosse, 1997; Mollinga, 1998, 2001;
Mehta et al., 1999), the ‘policy as process’
approach attempts to understand how water
policies are ‘produced’ by the interactions
between water users, dominant paradigms
and the institutional arrangements that
mediate water control. Through these
interactions, the content and composition
of policies are redefined and transformed,
frequently leading to very different results
6 M. Svendsen et al.
3 A process in which legislators trade concessions and support for sometimes unrelated objectives.
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from those envisioned. A politically
informed analysis of policy processes helps
to understand how policies work in practice
to change control over water and water
management, thereby giving insight into
who gains and who loses.
1.2.5 Roles and actors
Individuals and organizations take action,
and it is useful to define two other com-
monly used descriptive terms. Roles are
sets of expectations and tasks associated
with a particular function (Coward, 1980).
As such, roles can be played by individuals
or by organizations. Actors are those indi-
viduals or organizations who take actions
in a particular context, and thus play
roles. Actors can play a number of roles
simultaneously, and roles can be split
among different actors. Often actors, such
as a government ministry, will play roles
that relate to water resource management
while playing other non-water-related roles
at the same time. Stakeholders are individu-
als or groups which have a legitimate inter-
est in the management of water resources in
a basin but which may or may not play an
active role in basin planning and manage-
ment processes. Actors are thus included in
the set of basin stakeholders, but do not
comprise the entire set.
1.3. Basin Management
1.3.1 Context
1.3.1.1 Phases of basin closure
In Chapter 2, Molden et al. posit that river
basins pass through three phases as more
water is withdrawn by humans (develop-
ment, utilization and reallocation), and
argue the valid point that that institutions
need to have the ability to adapt to changes.
Keller et al. (1998) proposed a linear three-
phase model of river basin maturation,
with phases of exploitation, conservation
and augmentation. In this model, the final
phase is a search for new water sources –
from distant basins, or by desalinating
seawater, rather than reallocation.
Turton and Ohlsson (2000), expand
this general argument positing that water
scarcity per se is not the key issue, but
rather whether a society has the adaptive
capacity to cope with the challenges that
water scarcity poses. They argue that institu-
tional transitions need to occur in the water
sector as water becomes scarcer, the first
when water abundance turns to water
shortage and the second when water
shortage turns to water over-exploitation.
In their argument, the ‘ability to cope’ with
shortage is a critical societal attribute deter-
mining the ‘pain’ a society will feel as a basin
closes.
These models are inductive, attempting
to draw out an explanatory thread from a
body of experience. As such, they are heuris-
tic rather than predictive in particular cases.
Keller et al. (1998) emphasize the economic
logic of the sequence of development. In this
framework, at any point in time the cheapest
solutions are selected, from simple flow
diversion on to desalinization. Molden et al.
constrain the impulse to continuously
develop new sources of supply and instead
suggest that attention will shift to reallocat-
ing an ultimately fixed supply. In Turton
and Ohlsson’s approach, the logic of the
succession is based on a scale of complexity,
with the solution of water scarcity problems
demanding ever-increasing levels of social
resources. This approach assumes that
hydraulic development is the easiest
response, and that its exhaustion leads
to conservation efforts, later followed by
adjustments in allocations. The latter are
regarded as much more sensitive and likely
to generate social conflicts. These three
analytical grids are useful in making
connections between the degree of water
exploitation and types of human responses
– responses that are clearly related to the
degree of stress on the resource as well as
other factors. At the same time, they cannot
capture important nuances found in varied
concrete situations. A number of interesting
illustrations of this complexity are shown
below (Molle, 2003).
Managing River Basins 7
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• Sakthivadivel and Molden (2001) have
compared five basins said to be at dif-
ferent stages of exploitation and have
found that the problems faced by these
basins were different. However, several
of the problems encountered were not
those that would be typical of the phase
in which each basin was classified. For
example, East Rapti basin in Nepal is
an open basin, with only 5% of water
resources being used by agriculture. In
spite of this, water pollution from
industries and ‘intense competition’
for river water during the dry season
among wildlife sanctuaries, tourist
requirements, ecological requirements
and human use already appear as
severe problems that ‘need immediate
action’, although they are normally
associated with later phases of devel-
opment. In the Singkarak-Ombilin
basin, Sumatra, considered to be at
the beginning of the utilization/conser-
vation phase, water allocated to non-
agricultural activities and trans-basin
diversion threatens to throw the basin
directly into the last phase, where
water rights need to be more formally
specified and water reallocation
becomes paramount.
• Problems of pollution are generally
associated with late phases in which
the scarcity of the resource does not
allow adequate mitigation by dilution,
but it may also happen very early if
there are significant pollution point
sources with little regulated water to
ensure dilution as with gold mines in
South Africa.
• The need to design more complex
and integrated forms of organization at
the basin level is associated with an
ultimate phase of reallocation of very
scarce water resources. However, in the
case of France in the 1960s, it was
the problem of water quality and not
quantity that was the driving force,
despite both aspects being interlinked.
• Trans-basin diversion is considered in
trajectory models as a way to ‘reopen’
the basin after it has closed, but this
option is sometimes observed at much
earlier stages of development, espe-
cially in small and medium basins.
In Sri Lanka, this was commonly
achieved as early as the 5th century
(Mendis, 1993) and has remained a
basic feature of water resource develop-
ment ever since. Such transfers are
also typical of irrigation of mountain-
ous interfluves, where irrigated areas
straddle the boundary of two adjacent
basins.
• In the later phases of basin closure, a
wide range of measures are sometimes
undertaken to relieve pressure, and not
simply the reallocation strategy hypo-
thesized. The case of California, as des-
cribed by Turral (1998), clearly shows
not only that both efficiency and reallo-
cative measures are sought in parallel,
but that the gains they provide are
more limited than commonly believed
and need to be accompanied with a
substantial amount of supply augmen-
tation. Closure does not conclude
with reallocation but, rather, elicits
continuous improvements on all three
fronts (conservation, reallocation and
supply).
• Not all trajectories are upward. Histori-
cal examples of civilizations that have
not successfully maintained their
resource base and have collapsed
can easily be found. In Sri Lanka,
for example, aerial photographs reveal
a high density of abandoned, silted and
destroyed small tanks in some basins.
A classic case is that of ancient
Mesopotamia in the 9th century (cf.
Pointing, 1991).
It seems clear that decisions must be
understood also in terms of their political
economy. That is, decisions must be under-
stood not only on the basis of their actual
costs and social ‘pain’, but also in terms
of the identity of the beneficiaries and
the increased power or financial gain that
accrues to different actors as a result of
the decision taken. Costly solutions, such
as desalination, are sometimes justified and
implemented in lieu of less expensive
demand-management solutions because
8 M. Svendsen et al.
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they involve less political pain and can be
accommodated under the existing logic of
pork-barrel politics.
The difficulty of reforming management
varies, depending on many cultural, social
and political factors, but it is recognized that
‘regional politicians have a powerful intu-
ition that economic principles and the allo-
cative measures which follow logically from
them must be avoided at all costs’ (Allan,
1999). This largely explains the persistent
gap between consultant’s rationality and the
actual shape that policy measures take in
the real world. It also suggests why strict
economic analysis is not always the best
framework to use to understand the succes-
sion of state investments and responses.
Resource capture can occur at any time,
depending on the power balance within the
society, and is perhaps more frequent than
rational allocation.
The basin closure models are useful
in outlining hydrologic changes which tend
to take place in a generalized basin as
its water resources are utilized ever more
intensively and the response strategies
which tend to occupy the minds of basin
managers as this unfolds. In practice,
institutional responses are highly varied and
functions of a diverse range of forces and
influences.
1.3.1.2 The governance context
One of the most important, and least stud-
ied, aspects of the environment controlling
institutional change is the context of gover-
nance in which water resource organiza-
tions operate. Governance is defined as
the exercise of authority through formal
and informal traditions and institutions for
the common good. Governance includes:
(i) the process by which those in authority
are selected, monitored and replaced;
(ii) the capacity of the government to effec-
tively manage its resources and implement
sound policies; and (iii) the respect of
citizens and the State for the institutions
that govern economic and social inter-
actions among them (Kaufmann, 2000). In
Kaufmann’s framework, good governance
consists of six interlinked components:
• Voice and accountability;
• Political stability;
• Government effectiveness;
• Lack of regulatory burden;
• Rule of law;
• Control of corruption.
Problems stemming from poor governance
are numerous, well known and routinely
given a blind eye. Examples include
favouritism in granting water use permits,
kickbacks on construction and procurement
contracts, biased and inaccessible court
systems, withholding of data and sale of
public data for personal profit, promotion
of risk-averse bureaucrats and firing
of innovators, flaunting of water-quality
regulations by well-connected industries,
and bureaucratic red tape which strangles
local initiative. Quality of governance
pervades public decision making relating
to policy formulation, resource allocation,
legislation, rule enforcement and adjudica-
tion, making it the most important
single influence on the shape and pace
of institutional change in the water sector.
While difficult to change, improving the
quality of governance is not impossible,
and a variety of tools have recently been
developed to support such change, many
involving voice, transparency, information
and participation. Several specific ele-
ments, which can support improved
governance and promote institutional
change, are discussed in a subsequent
section.
1.3.2 Functions and actors
To analyse the institutional arrangements
for water management in a river basin
we propose a framework of essential
functions and enabling conditions. The
groundwork for this framework is provided
by drawing up a water account of a basin
as well as a basin profile that provides an
analytically rich description of the basin as
a sociotechnical system. The next step is to
identify the water management actors in a
river basin and the essential functions they
execute.
Managing River Basins 9
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1.3.2.1 Actors
To portray the multitude of water manage-
ment stakeholders in a river basin, it is use-
ful to distinguish between the various water
use sectors and the types of organizations
involved in water resource management.
Combining sectors with actors yields a
matrix of key organizations and stake-
holders involved in water management
in a basin (Table 1.1). This matrix, after
individual actors are identified under each
category, provides a basis for identifying
key actors in a particular basin.
1.3.2.2 Essential functions
To analyse basin governance, it is necessary
to focus on the roles and functions of the
various actors engaged in water manage-
ment in the basin, asking who does what,
where, to what end and how well. To
guide the analysis, a set of essential
functions for RBM has been identified
(Burton, 1999; Svendsen et al., 2001). These
are defined in Table 1.2. How well func-
tions are carried out, from whose perspec-
tive and for whose benefit are empirical
questions.
It is possible to construct alternative
lists of basin functions. This one was
empirically and inductively developed
from experience in a number of basins.
Its functions subsume supporting functions
such as data collection and resource
mobilization, which are not ends in them-
selves, but rather facilitate the higher-level
functions listed.
10 M. Svendsen et al.
Sector
Stakeholders Agriculture Domestic Industry Hydropower Environment Other
Multinational agencies
Government agencies
Private firms
Associations/NGOs
Informal groups
Note that government agencies may include national, sub-national and local entities, while private firms
can include both multinationals and local firms as well as regulated for-profit utilities. The list of sectors is
far from exhaustive and could also include fisheries, navigation, recreation, amenity value and others,
depending on local importance.
Table 1.1. Illustrative matrix of key water management stakeholders.
Function Definition
1. Plan
2. Allocate water
3. Distribute water
4. Monitor water quality
5. Enforce water quality
6. Protect against water
disasters
7. Protect ecology
8. Construct facilities
9. Maintain facilities
The formulation of medium to long-term plans for the management and
development of water resources in the basin, by which the water demands of
different sectors are brought in line with water supply.
The mechanisms and criteria by which bulk water is apportioned among the
different use sectors.
The activities executed to ensure that allocated water reaches its point of use.
The activities executed to monitor water pollution and salinity levels.
The activities executed to ensure that water pollution and salinity levels
remain below accepted standards.
Activities executed concerning flood and drought warning, prevention of
floods, emergency works and drought preparedness.
Actions undertaken to protect associated ecosystems.
Activities executed for the design and construction of hydraulic infrastructure.
Activities executed to maintain the serviceability of the hydraulic infrastructure
in the basin.
Table 1.2. Essential functions for river basin management.
22A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.prn
Z:\Customer\CABI\A4831 - svendsen\A4859 - Svendsen - Vouchers Proofs #P.vp
Friday, January 14, 2005 10:34:31 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  150 lpi at 45 degrees
1.3.2.3 Interactional analysis
Functions that should be performed in a
closing water basin for effective manage-
ment may or may not be performed, in
fact. Moreover, some may be performed
incompletely and some may even receive
more attention than they require. Since
many organizations and stakeholders are
involved with water management in a
river basin, a number that generally grows
with closure, more than one organization
will frequently be involved in performing
a particular function. To structure and
clarify the resulting patterns of activity,
the essential functions of basin manage-
ment can be crossed with key water man-
agement actors as illustrated in Table 1.3.
The essential functions are replicated, as
appropriate, across three broad categories –
surface water, groundwater and derivative
water. Because the perspective is basin-
wide, functions are not separated by sector,
e.g. irrigation or environment. Thus, the
category derivative water includes irriga-
tion return flows as well as municipal
wastewater and industrial discharges. Cells
in the resulting matrix are coded to show
whether the actor is judged to play a major
or a minor role. One of the case studies
in this volume (Chapter 9) adds another
dimension to the table and endeavours
to indicate the type of activity performed
by an actor in addressing a particular
function.
It is important to note that the matrix
depicts actual activity in practice and not
nominal responsibilities according to legal
frameworks or normative prescriptions
defining what should be done. The matrix,
together with description of the key actors,
gives an indication of which essential
functions are being addressed and who is
involved in their execution. The matrix
exercise can shed light on a number of
important questions:
• The functions covered and a rough
indication of the adequacy of coverage;
• The functions not covered;
• The number of actors involved in each
function and the need for coordination;
• The stakeholders represented in per-
forming particular functions, which
leads to conclusions about the repre-
sentativeness of the basin governance.
Perhaps more importantly, the process is
heuristic in that it produces insights and
questions that can be used to probe more
deeply into issues of functional perfor-
mance, relationships among actors, and the
political dynamics of basin governance and
management.
The actors/functions matrix can also
be used comparatively within a basin to
examine changes over time, the nature of a
transition to a desired future state, or nomi-
nal versus actual functional performance.
Furthermore, it can be applied compara-
tively to look for patterns among different
basins and national contexts. This is done in
Chapter 13 of this volume for several of the
case studies presented.
The matrix can be generated in different
ways. It can be filled in by expert observers
after study of a basin, as in the Turkey case
study. It can be created on the basis of
questionnaire survey results combined with
expert observation as was done in the
Mexico case, or it can result from focus
group interactions of knowledgeable per-
sons, as happened for the South African
case. Although used here as a research tool,
matrix generation can also be a useful under-
standing and consensus building tool among
the involved parties when used in focus
groups made up of key basin stakeholders.
1.3.3 Enabling conditions
Describing who executes the essential func-
tions in a river basin and how effectively,
while useful, does not constitute a suffi-
cient methodology for understanding and
diagnosing problems affecting basin gover-
nance. The essential functions and actors’
roles depicted in Table 1.3 provide a static
view of responsibilities. Additional attrib-
utes of well-functioning basin governance
systems relate to its dynamics.
In order for societies to reach decisions
consistent with the public interest, several
Managing River Basins 11
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conditions need to be satisfied. We term
these attributes enabling conditions (Box
1.2). Enabling conditions are features of the
institutional environment at the basin level
that must be present, in some measure, to
achieve good governance and management
of the basin. These attributes are not specific
to any one actor, but apply to all actors and
their interactions and comprise necessary
(but not sufficient) normative conditions
for good basin management. Most of them
contribute to good governance, as discussed
in an earlier section. Some basic enabling
conditions are shown in Box 1.2. A thorough
analysis of these factors is well beyond the
scope of this chapter, but a number of them
are described briefly.
1.3.3.1 Political attributes
An important political attribute is the repre-
sentation of interests. In most river basins,
some water users will be well represented,
while others will not, and in the arena of
political give-and-take, those without repre-
sentation become losers. Industrialists and
commercial farmers, for example, typically
have ample financial resources, are well
organized and have ready access to political
decision makers. Poorer irrigators, on
the other hand, are likely to be less well
organized and consequently will be weakly
represented. Their interests are often rather
fragile. Water users associations (WUAs)
are likely to be intermediate, particularly
if they are connected to the local political
establishment and collaborate informally,
sharing information and coordinating activ-
ities. Many times WUAs would benefit by
establishing more formal linkages among
themselves to allow a single spokesperson
to represent them collectively in discussions
over basin water allocation, water quality
standards, potential irrigation return flow
restrictions, and so on.
A serious failure of representation
will frequently exist for the environment.
Experience has shown that strong non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) rooted
in civil society are essential components of a
political system making socially responsible
choices about environmental issues. NGOs
can serve as advocates for environmental
values and for unrepresented future generat-
ions. At the same time, fund raising
requirements may lead such mass-based
organizations to take extreme and uncom-
promising positions on issues that must
then be moderated in the give-and-take of
political debate and decision making.
Hence, fully as important as the exis-
tence of representational bodies is the need
for a rough balance of political power and
influence among various interests. When
power is one-sided, issues are not aired
adequately and decisions are also one-sided.
A key to the evolution of a suitable and
balanced governance regime is maturation
of non-government organizations and asso-
ciations based in civil society, which can
advocate for particular interests, coupled
with the informational attributes described
below.
1.3.3.2 Informational attributes
An essential enabling condition is the
presence in the public domain of accurate
and up-to-date descriptive information on
water-related issues in the basin. Another
is open public transactions, related to
policies, plans, regulations, violations and
sanctions. The first of these stipulations
require that information on basin water
allocations, reservoir positions, ground-
water elevations, water-quality conditions,
Managing River Basins 13
Box 1.2. Enabling conditions.
Political attributes
Representation of interests
Balanced power
Informational attributes
Process transparency
Information availability
Information accessibility
Legal authority
Appropriate institutions
Adequate powers
Resources
Human
Financial
Institutional
Infrastructural
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available resources, and so on be a part
of the public record. Information collected
with public funds should be available
to the general public at little or no charge
in the interest of sound and democratic
public decision making. This disclosure
condition applies to intra- and inter-
departmental information relationships,
as well as to those with the general pub-
lic. The second stipulation, transparency
of public proceedings, is similarly essential
to fair democratic processes. Rent-seeking
behaviour requires darkness and privacy
to thrive, and conducting regulatory
processes in full view of the public and
the press is an effective antidote to such
practices.
1.3.3.3 Legal authority
Establishing appropriate organizations
requires suitable legal authority. This
authority includes the right to exist, the
right to a legal personality and suitable elec-
toral procedures to ensure representative
leadership of the organization. A legal
personality usually includes the right to
handle money and keep a bank account,
enter into contracts, access the legal system
and represent the membership in dealings
with governmental agencies.
In some cases, existing legislation has
been adapted to allow new water-related
organizations to be established. The forma-
tion of Irrigation Associations in Turkey
took this route. In other cases such as
Mexico, new legislation has been written at
the outset to facilitate establishment of new
organizations and relationships.
1.3.3.4 Resources
Clearly, all four types of resources listed
in Box 1.2 are needed for effective imple-
mentation of basin management activities.
A potential problem is scattering of human
and financial resources among a number of
organizations, where each lacks a critical
mass to be effective. In a context of coopera-
tion, it is not necessary that resources be
consolidated under a single administrative
structure for effective implementation.
However, cooperation and coordination
must be effective if a decentralized strategy
is to work.
1.3.4 Organizational configurations
The choice of a river basin as a unit of man-
agement is based on a certain hydrologic
imperative, controlled by gravity and topog-
raphy. However, establishing basin bound-
aries is by no means automatic. There
are choices involved in subdividing large
basins into management units, in grouping
small basins, and in deciding which natural
basins and sub-basins are to receive priority
attention. Moreover, there are often differ-
ences between surface water and ground-
water divides and basins, where choices
have to be made, and where water is
imported from neighbouring basins, contro-
versies have arisen over whether to include
the watershed of the transferred water in
the basin definition. Making such choices
has an important bearing on basin manage-
ment, as different boundaries imply differ-
ent decision makers and possibly different
decision outcomes. However, whether
defining boundaries is straightforward or
contentious, the defined basin becomes a
political unit as well as a hydrologic one
and questions immediately arise as to who
will make decisions, and how (cf. Wester
and Warner, 2002).
Mostert et al. (2000) posit three different
types of organizational configurations for
basin management. One is an authoritarian
model, in which management is organized
on hydrologic boundaries and a single orga-
nization makes basin decisions. The second
is a coordinative model, in which the basin
as a hydrologic unit is recognized, but many
functions remain in the hands of traditional
governmental units, and work is coordi-
nated among these units. The third is man-
agement by existing organizations without
coordination. The third model is, in reality,
not a model of basin management at all
but rather the business-as-usual backdrop
against which the two other models can be
contrasted.
14 M. Svendsen et al.
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We distinguish two basic organizational
patterns for basin governance.4 The first is
the centralized (unicentric) model, in which
a single unified public organization is
empowered to make decisions regarding
management of the basin. This centralized
organization is not necessarily ‘authoritar-
ian’, but does centralize authority under a
governance process that may be more or less
democratic. The second is the decentralized
(polycentric, coordinative) model, in which
the actions of existing organizations, layers
of government and initiatives are coordi-
nated to cover an entire river basin or sub-
basin. While new structures may be created,
the bulk of routine work is done by existing
organizations that are not specific to the
basin. Although both models are character-
ized by separations among the three basic
roles of management, regulation and service
provision, the firewalls between them are
typically stronger in the coordinative model
where separate organizations are involved.
In the real world, RBM structures are
usually hybrids, relying to some extent on
existing government structures to provide
policy and direction, and perhaps execute
particular management functions, and
basin-specific organizations to collect data,
and make certain circumscribed decisions.
We describe the two hypothetical models
briefly to illustrate the two poles of the
continuum.
1.3.4.1 Centralized (unicentric) RBMs
A strength of the centralized model is that
its operational span of control coincides
with the boundaries of the basin. This
internalizes upstream/downstream and
other conflicts, making them easier to deal
with, and it concentrates the decision-
making authority needed to resolve
disagreements. Disadvantages of the cen-
tralized model include the following: (i) as
the organization will generally deal only
with water, water will be isolated from
other relevant policy sectors such as
agriculture, environment and the economy;
(ii) establishing a strong unified central
authority presents a more challenging
political problem than securing agreement
for a coordinative body. The challenge here
will be even greater for international river
basins; and (iii) governance of a centralized
organization raises challenging questions
of broad stakeholder representation and
accountability.
The most prominent examples of
authorities are those having the develop-
ment of a river basin as a primary mandate.
The classic example is the TVA, which was
created during the economic depression of
the 1930s to address problems of poverty
and unemployment in a particular region of
the USA. Other examples are the Rio São
Francisco Development Agency in Brazil
and the Mahaweli Development Authority
in Sri Lanka. When their primary develop-
ment tasks are finished, these authorities
often try, with varying degrees of success, to
assume a broader resource management role.
1.3.4.2 Decentralized (polycentric) RBMs
The decentralized model addresses some
of the weaknesses of the centralized model
but contains others. On the plus side, it pro-
vides for a strong political base for action,
since coordination involves voluntary
agreement among participating jurisdic-
tions. The coordinative process also leads
to a more responsive governance process.
Intersectoral linkages remain intact, as
coordination is among individual states,
nations or other jurisdictions responsible
for a range of policy sectors, and such a
set-up provides a natural base for decentral-
ization of responsibilities. On the other
hand, decision making can be cumber-
some, coordinating costs may be high and
political changes in participating jurisdic-
tions can upset agreements.
These two models represent polar
extremes, and actual arrangements are often
blends of the two. In the Murray–Darling
Managing River Basins 15
4 We focus here on organizations and governance and not on the way in which particular functions are
executed. There are a range of options within each governance structure for providing services and executing
other functions.
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basin, for example, a cooperative Ministerial
Council, made up of representatives of the
four involved states and the federal govern-
ment, sets policy while under it an author-
ity-like Commission supports the Council
and executes its decisions. A similar set-up
exists in France, where a River Commission
made up of local and national government
representatives and users sets water policy,
which is implemented by an associated
Water Agency. Publicly held companies
manage the distribution infrastructure
and make bulk water deliveries to user
associations. In the USA, formal bodies for
managing river basins are rare, allowing
some exceptions such as the TVA and the
Delaware Basin Commission. Policy-making
authority is distributed among a variety of
federal and state agencies and departments.
Coordination is achieved through a plethora
of committees and working groups linking
stakeholders into discussion and decision-
making forums. Legislation and negotiated
legally binding agreements are important
instruments for establishing policy and
practices, and the court system is routinely
invoked to resolve disagreements and dis-
putes. In California, a state water plan,
updated every 5 years, provides a rolling
framework for managing the state’s water
resources.
1.4. Basin Management and Irrigation
As basins close, irrigation systems within
the basin are confronted with both internal
and external challenges. Internal challenges
require them to do more with less water,
whereas the external ones require them to
organize and act effectively to protect their
interests. Dealing with both at the same
time is difficult, and systems which address
the internal challenges successfully before
having to tackle the external ones will
generally be better off.
Closing basins, by definition, are
becoming water scarce, and newer rapidly
growing sectors, typically urban and indus-
trial users and the environment, will usually
demand that irrigated agriculture, as the
largest traditional user, use less water to
free more of it for their growing needs. This
puts pressure on irrigators to use water more
efficiently, and may lead to retirement of
less productive irrigated lands and transfer
of their water rights to other users, as is
presently happening in California’s Central
Valley. The cost of water will generally
increase to reflect its growing scarcity, lead-
ing to pressure to grow higher-value crops to
cover these costs. More efficient use of water
requires that irrigation systems acquire new
measurement and control technology, and
more professional management.
These same pressures may emerge as
challenges to agriculture’s right to use basin
water resources at all in legislative and legal
arenas. Often agriculture began using water
at a time when rights were not formally spec-
ified, which can make them less secure than
the formalized rights allocated to industries
and larger corporate irrigators which came
later. Where water rights are merely implicit
in the allocation priorities of a large public
irrigation agency, risks also arise. Regula-
tion, service provision and other functions
of unitary public water agencies tend to
be split up among several new agencies
or departments as basins mature, giving
basin managers a broader constituency
and weakening their ability to defend their
former clients. Basin-level decision-making
forums will tend to include more actors and
cover a broader range of issues, requiring
that irrigators mobilize to represent their
own interests vigorously and become con-
versant with a broader range of water-related
considerations.
Irrigators located downstream of major
population centres and industries will also
need to seek protection for the quality of
the water they receive. Urban concentra-
tions with inland locations, such as Cairo or
New Delhi, degrade significantly the quality
of water reaching downstream irrigators,
with impacts on human health and contami-
nation of produce and soil. Individually,
irrigators and small systems will have little
or no ability to apply pressure for reduced
pollutant loadings in their water supplies.
Organized into a larger network, they can
have influence.
16 M. Svendsen et al.
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